Translated from Korean

Can isolation be grouped under 'low-risk actions'?

Regarding Fzaynn15's post, I would like to add a few conditions to the part where “isolate a suspicious VM” was cited as an example of a low-risk action. I agree with the core sentiment of the post that human approval is necessary for operational disruptions or changes to access permissions. However, whether isolation can be easily included as an exception depends on how the management connection is configured.

The official Microsoft Defender for Endpoint documentation provides a specific warning. It explains that devices behind a full VPN tunnel may not be able to connect to the Defender cloud service after being isolated. It also notes that in environments using a web proxy, devices might not be able to recover from network isolation. The issue is that even if there is a button to release isolation remotely, the connection through which that command is received could be severed simultaneously.

I am not attempting to generalize this explanation to all virtual machines or failures of security AI. This is a vendor document regarding the network configuration of a specific product, and not the result of measuring failure rates by isolating actual devices. There is also no information that the VM in the original post uses such a configuration. However, when discussing the authority for automated execution, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the claim that something is “reversible” may implicitly rely on the condition that the environment allows the recovery command to be delivered.

The same official documentation also states that isolation helps prevent further activity and information leakage by an attacker. I agree with the necessity of stopping a spread quickly. Even so, it remains questionable whether an isolation whose management connection status is unverified should be classified as low-risk and left to proceed without human approval.

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